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CoRPORATIONs-PowER oF DIRECTORS TO TRANSFER ALL AssETS-D1sSENTERs' RIGHTS TO APPRAISAL AND PAYMENT-By action of its board of
directors, defendant corporation entered into a written extension of a lease of
substantially all its assets. This action was not authorized by a majority vote at a
shareholders' meeting or by the written consent of the holders of a majority of the
shares. Plaintiff, a shareholder of record on the date the lease was made, had po
knowledge of the transaction until about three months later, at which time he
objected to the making of the lease and demanded payment for his shares as
provided in section 44 of the Michigan general corporation act 1 under which
defendant was organized. Upon defendant's refusal to comply with this demand
plaintiff brought suit, citing section 57 of the act 2 but basing his right to recovery
entirely on section 44. Plaintiff alleged that the lack of a shareholders' meeting
and timely knowledge on his own part made it impossible for him to comply with
the provisions of section 44 which required him to vote against the lease and to
file written objection within twenty days of the time the action was taken. The
trial court found that the directors owned or controlled voting rights of more than
two-thirds of defendant's stock and that the lease divested defendant of substantially all its assets. An order was made for the appointment of appraisers, and
defendant appealed. Held, reversed. The extension of the lease by action of the
board of directors did not violate section 5 7, but was lawful and valid, since it was
in furtherance of the purposes of the corporation as set out in the articles of incorporation. Since a shareholders' meeting was not necessary under section 5 7 and was
never held, it was impossible for plaintiff to meet the statutory conditions precedent
to appraisal and payment under section 44. Pollack v. Adwood Corporation,
(Mich. 1948) 32 N.W. (2d) 62.
The general rule at common law is that a solvent and going corporation
canno.t dispose of all its assets without the unanimous consent of the shareholders. 8
The purpose of section 57 is to relax the stringent common law rule and take
away the power of a minority to block action desired by the majority, while section
44 is designed to compensate the dissenter by giving him at least a right to appraisal
and payment for his stock. 4 The rights of a dissenter under section 44 are completely
1

Mich. Acts (1931) No. 327, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 21.44 provides in part
as follows: "If a corporation has authorized the sale, lease or exchange of all or substantially
all of its assets a shareholder ••• who voted against such action may, within twenty days
••• object thereto in writing and demand ••• payment of the fair cash value of his
shares .•• and surrender at such time to the corporation the certificate or certificates for
his shares. • • •"
2
Section 57 provides in part as follows: "Every corporation .•. may sell, lease or
exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets •. ; when and as authorized
by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares issued and outstanding
given at a shareholders' meeting duly called for that purpose, or when authorized by the
written consent of the holders of a majority of the shares.•••"
8
Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. (N.Y.) 578 (1861); Voight v.
Remick, 260 Mich. 198, 244 N.W. 446 (1932). In general, see 13 FLETCHER, CYc.
CoRP.,perm. ed.,§ 5797 (1943); 6oA.L.R. 1210 (1929); and 79 A.L.R. 624 (1932).
4
Matter of Timmis, 200N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910); WILGUS AND HAMILTON,
MicH. CoRP, LAw, 325-326 (1932); 9 U.L.A. 132, 138 (1942); 13 FLETCHER,
CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., § 5891 (1943).

412

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

dependent upon compliance by a corporation with section 5 7, the former section
being predicated on the latter. 5 The legislative intent is clear, but the principal
case shows that the statute as now written leaves the rights of dissenters in a
rather precarious position. Section IO of the Michigan act 6 grants general powers
to boards of directors except as otherwise provided. Whenever a transfer of all
corporate assets by action of a board of directors is held valid as a legitimate
exercise of this general power, dissenters have no possible way in which to comply
with section 44. Directors are therefore in a position to deprive dissenters of their
rights unless the courts interpret section 57 as a restriction on the power granted
in section 10. It would seem on the face of it that section 57 is such a restriction/
and in the light of a recent Michigan case the finding that the lease in 'the principal
case was valid might be open to question, 8 although there is authority to support
it. 9 Be that as it may, a dissenter is not in court to contest the sale but has elected
to stand on the sale and get payment for his stock. The problem can only be solved
by legislative action, since the courts are committed to a strict interpretation of
the statutes as they now stand. 10 Extension of shareholders' control by broadening
section 57 would impair the freedom of action of directors in managing a
corporation and would seem undesirable. The logical solution might be to divorce
section 44 from section 57, perhaps by the addition of a proviso covering transfers
of all or substantially all of the corporate assets without authority of the shareholders.
In such cases, the provisions as to written objection and demand should be made
to depend upon the time at which the dissenter first has notice of the transfer.
Still, such a change might provide a means by which a shareholder, who has had
time in which to exercise hindsight, might escape frol_ll a corporation which has
5

See In re Drosnes, 187 App. Div. 425, 175 N.Y.S. 628 (1919), and Matter of
Timmis, supra, note 4, showing the interdependence of two similar sections in the old
New York Stock Corporation Law.
6
Section IO(k) provides: "The powers of a corporation, except as otherwise provided, shall be exercised by the board of directors. • • ."
1 Some states make different provisions for the sale of all assets in the usual course of
business and such sales not in the usual course of business, but the Michigan statute makes
no such distinction. As examples of the former type of statute, see Me. Rev. Stat. (1944)
c. 49, § 80; S.C. Code (1942) c. 153, § 7705; and Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 32,
§§ 157.71, 157.72.
8
Michigan Wolverine Student Co-Operative, Inc. v. Wm. Goodyear & Co., 314
Mich. 590, 22 N.W. (2d) 884 (1946), commented on in 45 M1cH. L. REv. 341
(1947).
9
See the cases cited in 6 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed.,§ 2949 (1931) and
79 A.L.R. 624 (1932), which show the reluctance of the courts to hold that statutes
similar to section 57 are applicable in borderline cases.
10
This is the general rule whenever a statute creates a new right of the type now
being discussed. Johnson v. C. Brigham Co., 126 Me. 108, 136 A. 456 (1927); Klein
v. United Theaters Co., 148 Ohio St. 306, 74 N.E. (2d) 319 (1947), not~d in 46
M1cH. L. REv. 562 (1948). But see In re Drosnes, 187 App. Div. 425, 175 N.Y.S.
628 (1919), where the statute was given a liberal construction. For a criticism of some
of the other weaknesses of appraisal statutes in general see 15 CoRN. L.Q. 420 (1930).

1 949]

RECENT DECISIONS

simply made a bad bargain; but the legislature might guard against this result by
requiring strict proof of time of notice of the transfer and good faith on the part
of the dissenter.
John C. Walker

